African mask cultures Research Paper Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1500 words

African mask cultures - Research Paper Example In Africa masks can be traced back to well past Paleolithic times. These art objects were, and are still made of various materials, included are leather, metal, fabric and various types of wood. African masks are considered amongst the finest creations in the art world and are highly sought after by art collectors. d) Ancestry has more influence in African culture than in any other culture. They honor their ancestors in all possible means because of their belief that ancestors can do many things in their life. Masks are recognized as the symbol of communication between an ancestor spirit and a human. Masks are also associated with celebrations, crop harvesting traditions, war preparations, peace and trouble times, rituals and customs of many of the African cultures. Because of the differences in belief, the meaning of mask wearing is different among different cultures in Africa. Ritual dances are common among many of the African cultures, and masks are important in all such ritual da nces. Each mask represents a particular spirit. It is believed by the African people that a person wearing a particular mask loses his identity temporarily and becomes the spirit represented by the mask itself. Even though mask wearing is mainly seen in African countries, the influence of African mask wearing custom has been spread to some other regions as well. Cubism, fauvism, and expressionism are some of the artistic movements which used the themes of African mask culture effectively. Moreover, in American and European art cultures also, the influence of African mask culture is visible. This paper briefly analyses the African mask cultures. (Pictures / photos / images of some MASKS and headdresses, 2010) â€Å"Ritual ceremonies generally depict deities, spirits of ancestors, mythological beings, good and or evil, the dead, animal spirits, and other beings believed to have power over humanity†(African Masks History and Meaning, n. d). Perhaps, Africa is the worst affected region in this world as far as beliefs in superstitions are concerned. Even after huge advancements in science and technologies, many of the Africans have still many superstitions. They do believe that the spirit of their ancestors or and even the spirit of the animals can influence their life very much. They are of the view that their life is shaped by these spirits and it is their duty to respect, recognize and worship these spirits to lead their lives in prosperity. Masks of ancestors are often considered as the most valuable thing in a family and they keep it as a monument. During the mask ceremony the dancer goes into deep trance, and during this state of mind he "communicate" with his ancestors. A wise man or translator sometimes accompanies the wearer of the mask during the ritual. The dancer brings forth messages of wisdom from his ancestors. Often the messages are grunted utterances and the translator will accurately decipher the meaning of the message. Rituals and ceremoni es are always accompanied with song, dance and music, played with traditional African musical instruments (African Masks History and Meaning, n. d). Ritual dances performed with the help of masks are often believed as the occasion to communicate with the ancestors. The dancer who wears the mask of a particular ancestor claims that he is able to communicate with the spirit represented by the mask. He may speak lot of things at the time of dance which may be perceived as the messages of that particular spirit to African community. The dancer mostly speaks in different languages which may not be understandable to

Seeking Pleasure and Happiness Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 250 words

Seeking Pleasure and Happiness - Essay Example Unfortunately, Billy is deadly wounded and is left recuperating injuries in a hospital and meets Sally, Bob Hyde’s wife. He believes that Sally will help her get over the anger, frustration, and pain he got from the war. Luke and Sally pursue happiness through sexual pleasure, and the two eventually engage in sex (Waldo, 2014). Sally gets an organism for the first time and she slowly starts forgetting her husband and starts enjoying the happy life with Luke. Luke feels exasperated by Billy’s decision to kill himself by injecting air into his body. Billy committed suicide as he was striving to obtain happiness and get over the injuries he got from the war, hence affirming the extent that people go in search of pleasure and happiness.  Similarly, in The Last Detail 1973, Larry Meadows is sentenced to 8 years in prison after his plan to steal $40 botched. The petty crime that Meadows expected to be a source of unending pleasure lands him in unfathomable miseries. As he i s transferred from Norfolk to Portsmouth prison, Buddusky and Richard Mulhall provide several adventures for Meadows as a way of ensuring that he obtains happiness before getting to prison (Chuck, 2013). Meadows, an underage, seeks pleasure in whiskey and visits a brothel where he loses his virginity and openly admits that the few profane activities he had engaged in when in the company of Buddusky and Richard gave him the greatest happiness in life. This is what Aristotle termed as Egoistic Hedonism that torpedoes an individual’s life.

Assignment in law (Legal Issues Relevant to the Quality of the Website Essay

Assignment in law (Legal Issues Relevant to the Quality of the Website and Indecent Images of Children, Invention Law, Expert Witness) - Essay Example Synergy Ltd, the company in which I am a systems manager does not want to be left out of the internet technology and its benefits. Therefore, the company has sought to develop a website in order to attract clients in the wake of the economic downturn. The website will provide relevant contact information, technical information, and a discussion group allowing registered users to discuss problems, and allow them to estimate the charge for recovering information. The company has sought the services of a developer to develop its website. There are legal issues that are relevant to the quality of website delivered by the developer and to protecting the company from problems. These issues include the following: private and security issue and legal liability issue. According to Baumer, Lyengar, & Moffie, (2003, p. 23), the issue of privacy and security is one of the main issues that surround creation of websites. Websites are crucial for storing and selling of information that benefits both the businesses and the consumers. However, there is a concern among businesses and consumers regarding their personal safety and privacy of their personal and other sensitive information. This concern is compounded by the ease with which information may be cross processed and collected from websites. In the United Kingdom, the issue of website security and privacy is covered under the Data Protection Act 1998 and Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations 2003 (Defago and Bockanic, 2006, p. 205). These Acts requires that cookies should be signposted on the websites. In addition, they require that visitors of the websites should be allowed to refuse or accept their personal details to be collected and used in the websites. Also, the Acts requires that personal information that is collected concerning individual visitors should be used or processed in accordance to the principles and provisions set out in the Privacy Regulations and the Data Protection Acts. More importantly, these Acts seek to protect businesses in an event that commercial relationships become ruined, as was demonstrated in the case of Ashton Investments v OSJC (2006). In this case, OSJC (a Russian company) employed spyware to the computer system of its former business partner, Ashton Investments, to hack illegally private information relating to the litigation between them. In the light of these two Acts and the need to protect the business in an event of ruined relationship between the company and its business partners, the developer of the website should ensure that the website has a high level of privacy and security. In regard to the issue of legal liability, it is important to point out that the utilization of Wide Web has prompted businesses to venture in unexplored business frontiers. As such, they are more likely to be exposed to legal risks. This issue has been exacerbating by the fact that most laws relating to cyberspace in both criminal and civil dimensions are still in comparative legal infancy. The legal liability issues relating to websites are copyrights, infringement of copyrights, website development contracts, appropriation of names, and defamation (Baumer, Lyengar, & Moffie, 2003, p. 24). In addition to under the Data Protection Act 1998 and Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations 2003, Digital Economy Act 2010 makes legal provisions for website and internet. The Act has provisions that seek

Seeking Pleasure and Happiness Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 250 words

Seeking Pleasure and Happiness - Essay Example Unfortunately, Billy is deadly wounded and is left recuperating injuries in a hospital and meets Sally, Bob Hyde’s wife. He believes that Sally will help her get over the anger, frustration, and pain he got from the war. Luke and Sally pursue happiness through sexual pleasure, and the two eventually engage in sex (Waldo, 2014). Sally gets an organism for the first time and she slowly starts forgetting her husband and starts enjoying the happy life with Luke. Luke feels exasperated by Billy’s decision to kill himself by injecting air into his body. Billy committed suicide as he was striving to obtain happiness and get over the injuries he got from the war, hence affirming the extent that people go in search of pleasure and happiness.  Similarly, in The Last Detail 1973, Larry Meadows is sentenced to 8 years in prison after his plan to steal $40 botched. The petty crime that Meadows expected to be a source of unending pleasure lands him in unfathomable miseries. As he i s transferred from Norfolk to Portsmouth prison, Buddusky and Richard Mulhall provide several adventures for Meadows as a way of ensuring that he obtains happiness before getting to prison (Chuck, 2013). Meadows, an underage, seeks pleasure in whiskey and visits a brothel where he loses his virginity and openly admits that the few profane activities he had engaged in when in the company of Buddusky and Richard gave him the greatest happiness in life. This is what Aristotle termed as Egoistic Hedonism that torpedoes an individual’s life.

Industrial Placement Case Study Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 3000 words

Industrial Placement - Case Study Example This clearly implies that poor performance of the human resource is hazardous to the organisation. One of the major human resource issues faced by most organisations is the high rate of employee turnover. Problems arise in many organisations as a result of unethical practices of the management towards the employees. This leads to more employee grievances and, in turn, affects the smooth functioning of the organisation. Increased rate of employee grievance is also a cause for high employee turnover. A good human resource management can help to solve the human resource issues of an organisation. Initially it was the personnel department who dealt with the employees in the organisation. But the personnel department only dealt with the technical aspects of the employees such as staffing, remunerating etc. Later on, human resource management became a separate department to look after the welfare of the employees at the work place. "Personnel management is more administrative in nature, dealing with payroll, complying with employment law, and handling related tasks. Human resources, on the other hand, are responsible for managing a workforce as one of the primary resources that contributes to the success of an organisation." (N. Madison. 2007). The terminology changed from personnel management to human resource management when the significance of the human resources in an organisation's success was identified properly. The fact that human consideration has to be given to the employees paved way to the formation of human resource departments in the organisation. The main functio ns of the human resource management include recruiting, selecting, placing, controlling, remunerating and motivating the employees of the organisation. Though human resource management's function includes all the activities beginning from recruiting the staff the main objective of human resource management is to provide a good working environment for the employees so that the employees feel good at work. The employees should be provided with sufficient benefits and allowances apart from salary, on the basis of their performance and as per the statute governing the employees' welfare. Human resource management in an organisation is mainly based on the concept that the employees in an organisation are human beings and they are unlike other resources. Employees will have their own problems and difficulties at their workplace arising as a result of the problems in their personal life. And also human resource is a factor whose behaviour cannot be predicted by any means. This study is aimed at identifying the human resource issues existing in the hotel giant Sheraton Hotels and Resorts. The study is conducted in Sheraton New York Hotel and Towers located in New York City. Sheraton is one of the oldest and the best hotels in the world. Currently it has very good market share in the hospitality industry. The final report is addressed to the top level human resource executives of the company for helping them to resolve the problem. Objectives of the report The main objective of preparing this report is to study and analyze the major human resource issues existing in the organisation. The study is routed to some of the areas which were found to be unsatisfactory

Our Moral Responsibility to Provide Monetary Aid to Pakistani Villagers Essay Example for Free

Our Moral Responsibility to Provide Monetary Aid to Pakistani Villagers Essay In this essay, I will argue that the theory of Utilitarianism presents resilient, compelling arguments that exemplifies why we have a moral obligation to donate money to help the Pakistani villagers affected by recent floods. Though the argument put forth by Ethical Egoists in favor of donating money to the Pakistanis is convincing, it lacks the quantitative validation that Utilitarianism provides. The Perspective of an Ethical Egoist Ethical Egoism is a consequentialist moral theory that says each person ought to pursue his or her own self-interest exclusively (EMP 69). A person’s only moral duty is to do what is best for him or herself, and he or she helps others only if the act [of helping] benefits the individual in some way (EMP 63). On the surface, it appears that it is not in a person’s best self-interests to donate money to help villagers in Pakistan. The giver experiences monetary loss and the diminution of personal financial wealth, and expends time, energy, and effort in the donation-transaction process. He or she receives neither public acknowledgement nor donor recognition. There are, however, intangible benefits that the giver may reap as a result of his or her deed, such as the satisfaction that he or she receives from giving monetary aid to the Pakistanis or the happiness that he or she experiences for acting in accordance with his or her values. It is in the giver’s self-interest and, therefore, his or her moral duty to give monetary aid to those plagued by the Pakistan floods. The facts that an Ethical Egoist would consider to be important are the consequences to him or herself because Ethical Egoism is a consequentialist moral theory that revolves around the self. Consequentialism contends that the right thing to do is determined by the consequences brought about from it (Class Notes, 10/05/2010). In this case, the morally relevant facts that the Ethical Egoist is primarily concerned with are the intangible benefits and advantages that he or she would receive from giving. The Ethical Egoist would also consider the actual and implicit costs of giving aid, as they are consequences brought about from helping the Pakistani villagers. The argument put forth by Ethical Egoism is good because it is compatible with commonsense morality. To reiterate, Ethical Egoism says that â€Å"all duties are ultimately derived from the one fundamental principle of self-interest† (EMP 73). According to Hobbes, this theory leads to the Golden Rule, which states that â€Å"we should ‘do unto others’ because if we do, others will be more likely to ‘do unto us’† (EMP 74). In this case, if we do not give to others, other people will not give to us. Thus, it is to our advantage to give to others. The Utilitarian Argument Classical, or Act, Utilitarianism maintains that the morally right act is the one that yields maximum happiness for all sentient beings impartially. Utilitarianism requires us to consider the general welfare of society and the interests of other people. Giving money to help the villagers in Pakistan generates positive consequences and diminishes the negative effects of the floods. Specifically, donations for disaster relief results in the availability of medicines to treat sicknesses, the provision and distribution of cooked meals, hygiene kits, and clothing, and the reconstruction and restoration of homes and schools. In short, giving money relieves great suffering of the flood-affected Pakistanis, enhances the balance of happiness over misery, and endorses the maximum and greater good of society. Therefore, the morally right thing to do is to donate money to help the Pakistani villagers. Similar to Ethical Egoism, Utilitarianism is a consequentialist moral theory, though this theory is concerned with the greater good of society. Therefore, the morally relevant facts for a Utilitarian are the consequences to all people impartially. In this case, they include the circulation of food, clothing, medicines, and the restoration of villages. Providing monetary aid ultimately produces the greatest balance of happiness over unhappiness for society. The Utilitarian argument for donating money is good because it provides calculable validation. In other words, the utility of the receivers is quantifiable and tangible (number of meals, hygiene kits, water tanks provided, number of homes rebuilt, etc. ). This tangibility clearly illustrates that the utility of the receiver exceeds the marginal cost to the giver and produces the greatest amount of happiness over unhappiness. Why the Utilitarian Argument is Stronger There is an epistemic problem that weakens the argument given by the Ethical Egoist. We do not know precisely what the consequences will be. We expect that the intangible benefits include self-satisfaction, enjoyment of giving, and happiness from providing financial aid, and we estimate that the costs consist of the actual donation payment and all related opportunity costs; however, we do not know exactly what the consequences will be and the extent of the results. It is, thus, difficult to gauge whether donating to charity is actually in the giver’s best self-interest exclusively because the associated costs may be very great (the giver may end up poorer or the donation-transaction process may be stressful; both situations would not be to his or her advantage). The immeasurability and intangibility of the benefits also weakens the argument. Ayn Rand, an Ethical Egoist, responds to this objection and asserts that it is completely moral and permissible to offer aid to others even when one does not anticipate any tangible return; â€Å"personal reasons for offering aid—reasons consistent with one’s values and one’s pursuit of one’s own life—are sufficient to justify the act† (Gordon Shannon, 10/16/2010). Rand says that personal reasons, such as values and pursuit of a flourishing life, are adequate to justify the act. We run, however, into a problem: just because we have a moral justification to give aid, does it mean we are morally required to give aid? Rand provides a moral justification, but not a moral mandate; this makes the argument put forth by Ethical Egoism weak. While Ethical Egoism provides a convincing argument and response to the objection, the Utilitarian argument is stronger because it buffers against the epistemic problem and provides quantitative, calculable validation. The problem of epistemology does not apply to or weaken the Utilitarian argument because we know what the consequences will be, based on present initiatives. Plan UK has provided cooked meals to over 250,000 people, shelter for 230,000, water tanks, hygiene kits, and medicines for thousands of families (Plan UK). We know how the money will benefit the Pakistani villagers and we can quantify the amount of happiness and good that entails the act of giving aid to others. To summarize: Ethical Egoism says that we ought to pursue our own self-interests exclusively. The morally right act is the one that benefits the self. There is, however, an epistemic problem. We do not know what the consequences will be or the extent of these outcomes. Donating to charity may not benefit the self. Utilitarianism, however, avoids the problem of epistemology and immeasurability. Therefore, Utilitarianism is the stronger argument. Conclusion In this paper, I have presented the theories of Ethical Egoism and Utilitarianism, delved into the morally relevant facts, and reflected on why each argument is good. I illustrated why Utilitarianism is stronger by appealing to a weakness of Ethical Egoism. Thus, the Utilitarian perspective that we have a moral duty to donate money to help Pakistani villagers is a better argument.

Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance

Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance CHAPTER II REVIEW OF LITERATURE Corporate governance paradigm is based on the argument of Berle and Means (1932) that separation of ownership and control leads to the problems associated with agency theory so that the managers of a company may not act in the best interest of owners. Throughout the twentieth century, the pattern of ownership continued to change from declining individual ownership to increasing institutional ownership. So, it is not surprising that institutional investors are increasingly looking more carefully at the corporate governance of companies because good governance goes hand in hand with increased transparency and accountability. Many studies have been conducted to see the impact of institutional holdings on corporate governance. Some researchers contend that substantial holdings by institutional investors and corporate governance are significantly correlated while others argue the absence of such a relationship. Evidences are also inconclusive on whether institutional investors invest in good governed companies or their holdings improve the governance practices. The role of institutional investors is visualized in two perspectives, the corporate governance and the firm performance. The present chapter covers the empirical studies on the above issues as institutional holdings and corporate governance, institutional holdings and firm performance, corporate governance and firm performance with special emphasis on the studies conducted in India on the above aspects. The present submission seeks to evaluate the impact of institutional holdings over corporate governance and firm performance by constructing governance score and taking various measures for firm performance. Various studies have focused on different aspects/levels of ownership and their effects on firm performance. As a result, various arguments have been put forward both in support and against the notion of the effects of ownership structure on the firm performance. While some researchers denied the direct correlation between ownership structure and firms economic performance while the others argued that there exists such a relationship for certain. Amongst those who establish such causality, some provide evidence that there is a negative relationship, while others plead a positive relationship between the two. Studies have also been carried to determine a link between varied aspects of corporate governance and firm performance; evidence in this regard too appears fairly mixed. There has been extensive literature to document a positive relationship between the two, based on identified individual aspects of corporate governance and firm performance whereas others do not find any conclusive evidence in this regard. Prepositions put forwarded by the researchers in this context are being reviewed here as under in the perspectives identified above: 2.1 Institutional Holdings and Corporate Governance Coombes and Watson (2000)1 on the basis of a survey of more than 200 institutional investors with investments across the world showed that governance is a significant factor in their investment decision. Three-quarters of the investors say that board practices are at least as important as financial performance. In fact, over 80% of the investors in the survey stated that they would pay more for the shares of a well-governed firm than a poorly governed firm with comparable financial performance. The survey indicated that the premium these institutional investors would be willing to pay varied by country, with premiums being higher in Asia and Latin America (where financial reporting is less reliable) than in Europe or the U.S. Bradshaw, Bushee and Miller (2004)2 indicated that firms whose accounting methods conform to U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles have a greater level of investment by U.S. institutional investors. They found further that increases in conformity with U.S. GAAP are positively associated with future increases in U.S. institutional investment, but that the reverse does not hold (i.e., increases in U.S. institutional ownership are not associated with later changes in accounting methods). The authors attributed this relation to home bias rather than better transparency (and corporate governance) however; their results are also consistent with the latter interpretation. Chung, Firth, and Kim (2002)3 hypothesized that there will be less opportunistic earnings management in firms with more institutional investor ownership because the institutions will either put pressure on the firms to adopt better accounting policies or they will be able to unravel the earnings management rule so it will not benefit the managers. They found that when institutional investors own a large percentage of a firms outstanding shares, there is less opportunistic earnings management (i.e., less use of discretionary accruals). Hartzell and Starks (2003)4 provided empirical evidence suggesting institutional investors serve a monitoring role with regard to executive compensation contracts. First, they found a positive association between institutional ownership concentration and the pay-for-performance sensitivity of a firms executive compensation. Second, they reported a negative association between institutional ownership concentration and excess salary. One implication of these results, consistent with the theoretical literature regarding the role of the large shareholder, is that institutions have greater influence when they have larger proportional stakes in firms. Parrino, Sias and Starks (2003)5 indicated that those firms that fired their top executives had a significantly greater decline in institutional ownership in the year prior to the CEO turnover than firms experiencing voluntary CEO turnover (even after controlling for differences in performance). These results support the hypothesis that institutional selling influences decisions by the board of directors-increasing the likelihood a CEO is forced from office. This implies that boards care about institutional trading and ownership activity in their firms. Further, the authors found that larger decreases in institutional ownership are associated with a higher probability of an outsider being appointed to succeed the CEO. This result suggests that directors are more willing to break with the current corporate management and institute change. They also noted that there are several potential effects when institutions sell shares. First, heavy institutional selling can put downward pressure on the stock price. Alternatively, institutional selling might be interpreted as bad news, thus triggering sales by other investors and further depressing the stock price. Finally, the composition of shareholder base might change, for example, from institutional investors with a long-term focus to investors with a more myopic view. This last effect might be important to directors if the types of institutions holding the stock affect share value or the management of the company. Cremers and Nair (2005)6 stated that the interaction between shareholder activism on behalf of institutional investors and the market for corporate control is important in explaining developments in abnormal equity returns and accounting measures of profitability. Davis and Kim (2007)7 found that mutual funds with conflicts of interest (based on management of pension assets) more often vote with management in general. On the other hand, mutual funds have more incentive and power to oppose management in firms in which they have a larger stake. McCahery, Sautner and Starks (2008)8 have relied on the survey data to investigate governance preference of 118 institutional investors in U.S. and Netherlands. The study found that the majority of institutions that responded to the survey take into account firm governance in portfolio weighting decisions and are willing to engage in activities that can improve the governance of their portfolio firms. Brickley, Lease and Smith (1988)9 found evidence supporting the hypothesis that firms with greater holdings by pressure-sensitive shareholders (banks and insurance companies) have more proxy votes cast in favor of managements recommendations. Moreover, firms with greater holdings by pressure-insensitive shareholders (pension funds and mutual funds) have more proxy votes against managements recommendations. The authors differentiated between the different types of institutional investors, noting the difference between pressure-sensitive and pressure-insensitive institutional shareholders and arguing that pressure-sensitive institutions are more likely to â€Å"go along† with management decisions. The rationale is that pressure-sensitive investors might have current or potential business relations with the firm that they do not want to jeopardize. Maug (1998)10 noted that institutions use their ability to influence corporate decisions are partially a function of the size of their shareholdings. If institutional investor shareholdings are high, shares are less marketable and are thus held for longer periods. In this case, there is greater incentive to monitor a firms management. However, when institutional investors hold relatively few shares in a firm, they can easily liquidate their investments if the firm performs poorly, and therefore have less incentive to monitor firm performance. Almazan, Hartzell and Starks (2003)11 provided evidence both theoretical and empirical that the monitoring influence of institutional investors on executive compensation can depend on the current or prospective business relation between the institution and the corporation. They concluded that the monitoring influence of institutions is associated more with potentially active institutions (investment companies and pension fund managers who would be less sensitive to pressure from corporate management due to lack of potential business relations) than with potentially passive institutions (banks and insurance companies who would be more pressure-sensitive). Marsh (1997)12 has argued that short-term performance measurement does work against the active monitoring by institutional investors. The performance of fund managers is evaluated over a shorter time period. Hence, they act under tremendous pressure to beat some index. So, when they find a case of bad governance, they find it economical to sell the stock rather than interfere in the functioning of the company and incur monitoring costs. Denis and Denis (1994)13 found no evidence to suggest that there is any relationship between institutional holdings and corporate governance. They stated that if companies that create shareholders wealth are the ones with poor corporate governance practices, and then one really cannot blame the institutional investors for having invested in such companies. For, after all, a fund manager will be evaluated on the basis of stock returns he creates for the unit holders and not on the basis of the corporate governance records of the company he invests the money in. If however, one finds that companies with poor corporate governance practices are the ones, which have consistently destroyed shareholders wealth, then the contention that the institutional investors need not look at corporate governance records cannot be justified. David and Kochhar (1996)14, provided empirical evidence regarding impact of institutional investors on firm behaviour and performance is mixed and that no definite conclusions can be drawn. They argued that various institutional obstacles, such as barriers stemming from business relationships, the regulatory environment and information processing limitations, might prevent institutional investors from effectively exercising their corporate governance function. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996)15 found little evidence of an association between total institutional ownership and other possible control mechanisms (e.g., insider ownership, block holders, outside directors, CEO human capital, and leverage). Payne, Millar, and Glezen (1996)16 focussed on banks as one type of institutional investor that would be expected to have business relations with the firms in which they invest. They examined interlocking directorships and income-related relationships, and noticed that when such relations exist; banks tend to vote in favor of management anti-takeover amendment proposals. When such relations dont exist, banks tend to vote against the management proposals. Leech (2002)17 is of the view that many institutional shareholders do not seek control of a company for a variety of reasons, which include the fear of obtaining price sensitive information, and that it is more likely that institutional investors seek only influence rather than complete control. Moreover, it has also been argued, in line with the â€Å"passive monitoring† view, that institutional investors may not be keen to â€Å"exit† on their investments â€Å"i.e. sell their equity stakes when the firm is not performing optimally, mainly because they hold large investments and thus selling may lower the price and further increase any potential loss. Woidtke (2002)18 concluded by comparing the relative value of firms held for public versus private pension fund that relative firm value is positively related to private pension fund ownership and negatively related to (activist) public pension fund ownership. These results supported the view that the actions of public pension fund managers might be motivated more by political or social influences than by firm performance. Ashraf and Jayaman (2007)19 examined mutual funds trading behavior after the release of voting records. The study found that funds that support shareholder proposals reduce holdings after the release of voting records. Since the time of releasing voting records could be very far from the shareholder meeting date, mutual funds trading behavior after the release of voting records may be unrelated to the votes cast in the meeting. Dahlquist et al. (2003)20 analyzed foreign ownership and firm characteristics for the Swedish market. The study found that foreigners have greater presence in large firms, firms paying low dividends and in firms with large cash holdings and explained that firm size is driven by liquidity. It reiterated that foreigners tend to underweight the firms with a dominant owner. Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003)21 asserted that the information problems cause foreigners to hold fewer assets in firms. Firm level characteristics can be expected to contribute to the information asymmetry problems. Concentrated family control makes it more likely that information is communicated via private channels. Informative insiders have incentives to hide the benefits from outside investors by providing opaque financial statements and managing earnings. Haw, Hu, Hwang and Wu (2004)22 found that firm level factors cause information asymmetry problems to FII. It found evidence that US investment is lower in firms where managers do not have effective control. Foreign investment in firms that appear to engage in more earnings management is lower in countries with poor information framework. Choe, Kho, Stulz (2005)23 found that US investors do indeed hold fewer shares in firms with ownership structures that are more conducive to expropriation by controlling insiders. In companies where insiders are dominating information access and availability to the shareholders will be limited. With less information, foreign investors face an adverse selection problem. So they under invest in such stocks. Covirg et al. (2008)24 concluded that foreign fund managers have less information about the domestic stocks than the domestic fund managers. They found that ownership by foreign funds is related to size of foreign sales, index memberships and stocks with foreign listing. Leuz, Lins, and Warnock (2009)25 found that foreign institutional investors prefer to invest in firms with â€Å"better† governance practices. This literature assumes that firm level corporate governance mechanisms substitute for weak country level legal protections of minority shareholders. Aggarwal, Klapper and Wysocki (2005)26 found that U.S. mutual funds tend to invest greater amounts in countries with stronger shareholder rights and legal frameworks (controlling for the countrys economic development). In addition, within the countries, the mutual funds also discriminate on the basis of governance in that they allocate more of their assets to firms with better corporate governance structures. Resume After reviewing the literature on the above sub-section, it is concluded that the results are inconclusive regarding the association between institutional holdings and corporate governance as some studies invariably support the hypothesis that institutional holdings and corporate governance are significantly related while the others reject it. But the results are uniform on one issue that there is positive relation between the foreign institutional holdings and corporate governance as foreign institutional investors are relatively more concerned about the governance practices of companies and countries as well. They prefer to invest more in the countries with stronger shareholder rights and legal frameworks. Similarly, they do invest in the companies with good disclosure and transparency measures. A group of studies contend that institutional investors consider governance practices of companies as an important consideration for investment decision. They not only care for financial performance of target companies, but also put great emphasis on the board practices. They are ready to pay premium for good governance. Institutional investors can put pressure on firms improve their governance practices if they have substantial stake in the target companies and do not have business relations with them. Moreover, if they dont involve themselves actively in governance but only vote with their feet it serves as a deterrent for the management in practicing bad governance. As it will send bad signal to the stock market leading to further decline in the stock prices and may be changing the shareholder base from dynamic institutional investors with long-term focus to myopic investors. Whereas in other studies, it has been observed that institutional investors prefer to remain passive and concentrate on their own business objectives, rather than look into the governance practices of companies. They do not involve themselves actively in the governance of firms for variety of reasons as short-term performance measurement, business relationships, regulatory environment, information processing limitations, free-rider problem etc. Moreover, they may not be interested in selling the shares of poor firms as they have large holdings and selling may aggravate their potential loss. 2.2 Institutional Holdings and Firm Performance Pound (1988)27 explored the influence of institutional ownerships on firm performance and proposed three hypotheses on the relation between institutional shareholders and firm performance: efficient-monitoring hypothesis, conflict-of-interest hypothesis, and strategic-alignment hypothesis. The efficient-monitoring hypothesis says that institutional investors have greater expertise and can monitor management at lower cost than the small atomistic shareholders. Consequently, this argument predicts a positive relationship between institutional shareholding and firm performance. The conflict-of-interest proposition suggests that in view of other profitable business relationships with the firm, institutional investors are coerced into voting their shares with management. The strategic-alignment hypothesis states that institutional owners and managers find it mutually advantageous to cooperate. Holderness and Sheehan (1988)28 found that for a sample of 114 US firms controlled by a majority shareholder with more than 50% of shares, both Tobins Q and accounting profits are significantly lower for firms with individual majority owners than for firms with corporate majority owners. Hermalin and Weisbach (1988)29 further stated that the managerial ownership is positively related to performance between 0-1% of managerial ownership, negatively related thereafter up to 5%, and again positively related from 5-20% and negatively related thereafter. Boardman and Vining (1989)30 compared the performance of state owned enterprises, joint enterprises, and private corporations among the 500 largest non-US industrial firms, and found that mixed enterprises and state owned enterprises perform substantially worse than similar private enterprises. McConnell and Servaes (1990)31 found a strong positive relationship between the value of the firm and the fraction of shares held by institutional investors. They found that performance increases significantly with institutional ownership. Han and Suk (1998)32 found (for a sample of US firms) that stock returns are positively related to ownership by institutional investors, thus implying that these corporate owners are actively involved in the monitoring of incumbent management. They also found that alignment effect dominates if the managers own up to 41.8% of the share capital. They further evidenced that beyond the limit of 41.8%, the mangers are able to control the Board of directors and so the entrenchment effect dominates the alignment effect. Majumdar and Nagarajan (1994)33 found that levels of institutional investment are positively related to the current performance levels of firms. However, a less-stronger, though positive, effect is established between changes in performance levels and changes in institutional ownership. The results are based on a study investigating U.S. institutional investors investment strategy. Bethel et al. (1998)34 consistent with the view that market for partial corporate control identifies and rectifies problems of poor corporate performance, found that activist investors typically target poorly performing and diversified firms for block share purchases, and thereby assert disciplinary effect on target companies plans in mergers and acquisitions. Douma, Rejie and Kabir (2006)35 investigated the impact of foreign institutional investment on the performance of emerging market firms and found that there is positive effect of foreign ownership on firm performance. They also found impact of foreign investment on the business group affiliation of firms. Investor protection is poor in case of firms with controlling shareholders who have ability to expropriate assets. The block shareholders affect the value of the firm and influence the private benefits they receive from the firm. Companies with such shareholders find it expensive to raise external funds. Bhattacharya and Graham (2007)36 investigated the relationship between different classes of institutional investors (pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant) and firm performance in Finland. It documented evidence that these institutional owners own stakes in multiple firms across industries, leading to a possible two-way causality or endogenous problem between firm performance and ownership structure. It was also evidenced that institutional investors with likely investment and business ties with firms have negative effect on firm performance and the impact is very significant in comparison to the negative effect of firm performance on institutional ownership. Wiwattanakantang (2001)37 investigated the effects of controlling shareholders on corporate performance and found that presence of controlling shareholders is associated with higher performance, when measured by accounting measures such as return on assets and the sales-asset ratio. However, the controlling shareholders involvement in management has a negative effect on the performance and it is more pronounced when the controlling shareholder and managers ownership is at the 25-50 percent. The evidence also revealed that family controlled firms display significantly higher performance. Foreign controlled firms as well as firms with more than one controlling shareholder also have higher return on assets, relative to firms with no controlling shareholder. Abdul Wahab et al. (2007)38 examined the relationship between corporate governance structures, institutional ownership and firm performance for 440 Bursa Malaysia listed firms from 1999 to 2002 and found that institutional investors have a positive impact on firms corporate governance practices. Qiet et al. (2000)39 found that firm performance is positively related to the proportion of shares owned by the state. In addition, they found little evidence in support of a positive correlation between corporate performance and the proportion of tradable shares owned by either domestic or foreign investors. Wahal (1996)40 observed that although institutional investors, particularly, activist institutions, have been successful in their efforts to affect the governance of targeted firms, these same firms have not demonstrated performance improvements. Studies examining the relationship between institutional holdings and firm performance in different countries (mainly OECD countries) have produced mixed results. Chaganti and Damanpour (1991)41 and Lowenstein (1991)42, for instance, find little evidence that institutional ownership is correlated with firm performance. Seifert, Gonenc and Wright (2005)43 study does not find a consistent relationship across countries. They conclude that their inconsistent results may reflect the fact that the influence of institutional investors on firm performance is location specific. The above studies generally consider institutional investors as a monolithic group. However, Shleifer and Vishnys (1997)44 as well as Pounds (1988)45 theorizations and later empirical examinations by McConnell and Servaes (1990)46 suggest that shareholders are differentiable and pursue different agendas. Jensen and Merkling (1976)47 also show that equity ownerships by different groups have different effects on the firm performance. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996)48, Duggal and Miller (1999)49 find no such significant relation between institutional holdings and firm performance. Resume Various studies on relationship between institutional holdings and firm performance have been reviewed in the above sub-section and the results are mixed. Different researchers have taken different performance measures as some of them have considered accounting measures but others have taken stock market indicators.Some of the observations contend that institutional investors are more expert in monitoring the affairs of companies as compared to individual investors; their holdings improve the financial performance of target companies. The results are more significant, where managers also have some ownership stake so as to have alignment effect. Moreover, if their stake is substantial, they can also assert disciplinary action against the poorly performing firms. Similarly, foreign institutional investors have also positive impact on the firm performance. But the results of other observations state otherwise. They state that if institutional investors have business ties with the firms, they would go along with the management and it may have negative impact on the firm performance. The studies have revealed out an interesting observation that Institutional holdings have positive effect on firm performance but their active involvement in management has negative effect. Some of the observations state that institutional investors may have significant impact on the governance practices of companies but do not improve financial performance. 2.3 Corporate Governance and Firm Performance Lipton and Lorsch (1992)50 found that limiting board size improves firm performance because the benefits by larger boards of increased monitoring are outweighed by the poorer communication and decision-making of larger groups. Millstein and MacAvoy (1998)51 studied 154 large publicly traded US corporations over a five-year period and found that corporations with active and independent boards appear to have performed much better in the 1990s than those with passive, non-independent boards. Eisenberg et al. (1998)52 found negative correlation between board size and profitability when using sample of small and midsize Finnish firms, which suggests that board-size effects can exist even when there is less separation of ownership and control in these smaller firms. Vafeas (1999)53 found that the annual number of board meeting increases following share price declines and operating performance of firms improves following years of increased board meetings. This suggests meeting frequency is an important dimension of an effective board. Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999)54 observed that CEO compensation is lower when the CEO and board chair positions are separate. It is further shown that firms are more valuable when the CEO and board chair positions are separate. Botosan and Plumlee (2001)55 found a material effect of expensing stock options on return on assets. They used Fortunes list of the 100 fastest growing companies and obtained the effect of expensing stock options on firms operating performance. Morgan and Poulsen (2001)56 found that pay-for-performance plan generally helps to reduce agency problems in the firm as the votes approving the plan are positively related to firms that have high investment or high growth opportunities. On the other hand, votes approving the plan are inversely related to negative features in some of the plans such as dilution of shareholder stakes. Mitton (2002)57 examined the stock performance of a sample of listed companies from Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. It reported that performance is better in firms with higher accounting disclosure quality (proxied by the use of Big Six auditors) and higher outside ownership concentration. This provides firm-level evidence consistent with the view that corporate governance helps explain firm performance during a financial crisis. Claessens et al. (2002b)58 observed that firm value increases with the cash-flow ownership (right to receive dividends) of the largest and controlling shareholder, consistent with â€Å"incentive† effects. But when the control rights (arising from pyramid structure, cross-holding and dual-class shares) of the controlling shareholder exceed its cash-flow rights, firm value falls, which is consistent with â€Å"entrenchment† effects. Deutsche Bank AG (2004a and 2004b)59 explored the implications of corporate governance for portfolio management and concluded that corporate governance standards are an important component of equity risk. Their analysis also showed that for South Africa, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East, the performance differential favored those companies with stronger corporate governance. Fich and Shivdasani (2004)60 based on Fortune 1000 firms, asserted that firms with director stock option plans have higher market to book ratios, higher profitability (as proxied by operating return on assets, return on sales and asset turnover), and they document a positive stock market reaction when firms announce stock option plans for their directors. Gompers et al. (2003)61 examined the ways in which shareholder rights vary across firms. They constructed a ‘Governance Index to proxy for the level of shareholder rights in approximately 1500 large firms during the 1990s. An investment strategy that bought firms in the lowest decile of the index (strongest rights) and sold firms in the highest decile of the index (weakest rights) would have earned abnormal returns of 8.5% per year during the sample period. They found that firms with stronger shareholder rights had higher firm value, higher profits, higher sales growth, lower capital expenditures, and made fewer corporate acquisitions. Brown, Robinson and Caylor (2004)62 created a broad measure of corporate governance, Gov-Score, based on a new dataset provided by Institutional Shareholder Services. Gov-Score is a composite meas